FISCAL RULES AND DISCRETION IN A WORLD ECONOMY

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【作者】 Marina Halac  Pierre Yared 

【出版日期】2015-01-01

【摘要】Governments are present-biased toward spending. Fiscal rules are deficit limits that trade off commitment to not overspend and flexibility to react to shocks. We compare centralized rules —- chosen jointly by all countries —- to decentralized rules. If governments' present bias is small, centralized rules are tighter than decentralized rules: individual countries do not internalize the redistributive effect of interest rates. However, if the bias is large, centralized rules are slacker: countries do not internalize the disciplining effect of interest rates. Surplus limits and money burning enhance welfare, and inefficiencies arise if some countries adopt stricter rules than imposed centrally.

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